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Article 3

ZONING OUT RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The application of zoning ordinances to thwart efforts
of private groups wishing to erect schools and churches
recently has given rise to litigation in several state
courts. Naturally, questions of due process and equal
protection of the laws are brought before the courts in
these cases. Moreover, when the problem involves religious groups and organizations, cognizance must also be
given to the provisions of the first amendment regarding
the free exercise of religion. This recent litigation will be
examined in order to determine whether these zoning
ordinances prohibiting the establishment of churches and
private schools in residential neighborhoods comply with
the constitutional guaranties of the first and fourteenth
amendments.
Comprehensive municipal zoning ordinances were first
given validity by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' It is fundamental
that the validity of zoning ordinances is based on the police power of the state or municipality. In its decision, the
Court referred to an Illinois case2 quoting from it with
approval:
With the growth and development of the state the police
power necessarily develops, within reasonable bounds,
to meet the changing conditions. ... The exclusion of
places of business from residential districts is not a
declaration that such places are nuisances, or that they

are to be suppressed as such, but it is a part of the
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2 Aurora v. Burns, 319 I1. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925). See also, State ex
Civello v. New- Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 444 (1923).
1

(627)

rel.
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general plan by which the city's territory is allotted
to different uses in order to prevent, or at least to reduce, the congestion, disorder, and dangers which often
inhere in unregulated municipal development.3

In a similar vein forty-two years earlier, Mr. Justice
Field stated that ". . . the [fourteenth] amendment . . .
was [not] designed to interfere with the power of the State,
sometimes termed its police power.., to prescribe regulations to promote the health . . . and good order of the
people... ."' If the police power has precedence over the
fourteenth amendment, as this statement of the Court
seems to indicate, what of the first amendment which
provides that Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion or prohibiting its free exercise?

II.

ExCLUSION OF CHURCHES

In City of Sherman v. Simms,' the Supreme Court of
Texas held that arbitrary and discriminatory regulations,
under the guise of the police power, would not be upheld,
and that the exclusion of churches from residential districts and the relegation of them to business and industrial
districts was arbitrary and unenforceable.
The issuance of a building permit for the erection of a
church in a residential district in State ex rel. Roman
CatholicBishop v. Hill,6 was directed despite the provisions
of a zoning ordinance which barred churches without the
approval of 75 per cent of the property owners in the
neighborhood. After citing a number of cases in which it
was held that churches may not be barred from residential
zones, the court said:
149 N.E. at 788.
41Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
* 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415 (1944).
6 59 Nev. 231, 90 P.2d 217 (1939).
3
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As against these authorities, cases involving livery
stables, garages, gasoline stations, funeral parlors, billboards, two-family residences, morgues, laundries, etc.,
afford us little aid in the instant case. The law distinguishes between such cases and those relating to
churches, schools, parks and playgrounds, art galleries,
library buildings, community center buildings, etc. In
some, if not most zoning ordinances, churches
are ex7
pressly classified in first residence districts.

Religious schools have fared equally as well as churches
under the first amendment. As early as 1927, in Western
Theological Seminary v. Evanston,' the Supreme Court
of Illinois declared void a zoning ordinance which barred
a private religious seminary from a residential district
but permitted public schools in the same area. In 1932,
the Supreme Court of Oregon in Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker9 held that a zoning ordinance may not
discriminate in favor of public schools and against private
schools in the matter of their location in a residential zone.
In West VirginiaState Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,'° the court
went even further in recognizing the limitations of state
power to regulate first amendment freedoms:
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles
of the First, is much more definite than the test when
only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness
of the due process clause disappears when the specific
prohibitions of the First becomes its standard. The right
of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may
well include, so far as the due process test is concerned,
power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature
may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms
of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may
not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawId. at 220.
325 Ill. 511,156 N.E. 778 (1927), modified, 333 Ml. 257,162 NE. 863 (1928).
9 140 Ore. 600, 15 P.2d 391 (1932).
30 319 U.S. 625 (1943).
7

8
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fully protect."

In view of the unanimity of these and a score of similar
decisions, E. C. Yokley, probably the leading authority on
zoning laws, stated:
In the light of a well known Illinois decision affecting
discrimination between classes of schools permitted in
certain zones, it is well to again state the general principle that a zoning ordinance restricting the property rights
of an individual without having any direct or substantial
relationship to the promotion of the public health,
safety, morals or welfare is invalid.
There are many other cases . .. that uniformly follow
this rule that discrimination between
public and private
2
schools will not be tolerated.'

However, a 1949 California case' 3 placed in jeopardy
what had appeared to be a settled principle of law.
Prior to 1948, a typical California comprehensive zoning
ordinance had been adopted in the city of Porterville, dividing the city into four types of residential zones: (1) R-1,
single family residential; (2) R-2, duplex or double family
residential; (3) R-3, apartments or multiple residential,
including hotels, boarding and lodging houses, clubs, fraternities, sororities, and hospitals; and (4) R-4, unlimited
residential, including all of the foregoing, plus libraries,
museums, schools, churches, religious institutions, etc.
Several years prior to the adoption of this municipal zoning
ordinance, the Porterville Mormons had acquired vacant
land, taking title as "the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints."
At the time of acquisition, this land was outside the city
limits of Porterville. Subsequently this area was annexed
to the city and became part of a "single family residential"
zone (R-1).
n

Id. at 639.

12

1 YOiuLzY, ZONING LAW Am

PRACTICE 89 (2d ed. 1953).

Is Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203
P.2d 823 (1949).
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In 1948, the Mormons applied for a building permit,
stating the building was to be used and occupied for religious worship functions and study and for youth activities and other church functions. When the building
permit was denied, a petition for a writ of mandate was
filed, to which the city of Porterville demurred. The
trial court sustained this demurrer, without leave to amend,
and the church appealed. The California District Court of
Appeal unanimously affirmed the judgment of the trial
court and appellant's petition for a hearing by the Supreme
Court of California was denied. Further appeal was denied
when the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed
the case for want of a substantial federal question.' Thus,
for the first time in any state, a municipal zoning ordinance
-was held superior to the constitutional guaranties of due
process and the free exercise of religion.
Actually, close scrutiny of the record reveals an entirely
,opposite constitutional aspect to this case. Six years later
in another epochal California case, 5 Andrew F. Burke,
an outstanding authority on the religious aspect of zoning
laws, declared before the California Supreme Court: "The
Porterville decision is bad law, in that it is based upon an
insufficient petition and record. We confidently predict that
it will be over-ruled whenever this Court has the opportunity to fully consider the constitutionality of a zoning
law which attempts to exclude churches from any part of
a municipality."' 6
Careful reading of the Portervilleopinion would seem to
substantiate this viewpoint. The court held the original
petition failed to state a cause of action. Nowhere in the
petition did the plaintiff invoke the constitutional guaranty
338 U.S. 805, rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 939 (1949).
Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d
-438 (1955).
16 Brief for Petitioner, answering Respondents' petition for a rehearing,
'p. 19, Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d 438
'4
'5

-(1955).
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of the free exercise of religion. The only constitutional issue
raised was deprivation of petitioner's property without
due process of law. The plaintiff argued that the trial court
should not have sustained the demurrer to its defective
petition without leave to amend. Yet the plaintiff did not request such leave to amend. The judgment even recited that
the plaintiff had advised the court that leave to amend
would be futile. Having elected to stand on the allegations
of the petition and having declined to amend it, plaintiff's
cause obviously was hopeless in the prosecution of any appeal. The district court of appeal could deal only with the
allegations of the original trial court petition and therefore
treated the case as if it involved a purely commercial enterprise, a corporation whose right was inferior to the rights
of residents of a restricted zone. In this regard the court
stated: "The petitioner is not a congregation, but holds its
property as a corporation sole, the existence of which depends upon the laws of the State. Having such right from
the State, the enjoyment of the property is subject to reasonable regulations."'
The Porterville decision produced many undesirable
results. It was the exception which was to prove the rule
and which set up the principle that zoning laws take
precedence over the bill of rights. It held that personal
convenience has a higher place in the law than the constitutionally guaranteed right of religious worship. Yokley
unequivocally terms it, "an expression of the minority
rule" and stresses that the ". . . overwhelming majority
of decisions in all jurisdictions other than Californiais to
the contrary." (Emphasis added.)"8
Nevertheless, it was the law in California and as such it
was to affect the lives, education, and faith of thousands,
other than Mormons, for half a decade. In 1951, it caused
17 Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203
P2d 823, 825 (1949).
18 2 YoxLEY, ZoNING LAw A PRAcTicE 111 (2d ed. 1953).
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the discontinuance of the construction of a Baptist church
in Chico, California.1" It was used by the Planning Commission of Ross, a San Francisco suburb, to deny a building
permit for a Seventh Day Adventist church. Similarly,
the Orange County Planning Commission and the Board
of Supervisors near Los Angeles, in 1955, refused a building permit to the Sisters of St. Louis for a convent and
kindergarten in a district zoned for "estates." These two
denials were not appealed to the courts.
Il.

ExcLusIoN OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS

If a Mormon church could be excluded from a "single
family residence" zone, what would be the status of a
private school in such a zone? In 1953, the Wisconsin
Lutheran High School Conference applied for a high
school building permit in a "Class A" zone of Wauwatosa, a
suburb of Milwaukee. The application was denied. The
Conference petitioned for and was granted a writ of
mandamus. Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, which reversed,' ruling that a "Class A" residential district may be limited to single family dwellings,
public elementary and high schools, and private elementary schools, to the exclusion of a private high school.2"
The majority opinion 2 ' made it emphatic that:
...

The present appeal is decided on the narrower ground

that tangible differences... sustain the distinction made
by the ordinance between the schools. To begin with,
the term "public" is the antithesis of "private." The
public school is not a private one. They serve different
19

Chico v. First Ave. Baptist Church, 108 Cal. App. 2d 297, 238 P.2d 587

(1951).

20 State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 267
Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43 (1954).

21 For a thorough consideration of the "discrimination" doctrine as advanced by the majority, see, Seitz, Constitutional and General Welfare Considerations in Efforts to Zone Out Private Schools, 11 Amm L. Q. 68, 77
(1956).
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Is that difference

material to the purpose of zoning? In many respects the
two schools perform like functions and in probably all
respects concerning noise, traffic difficulties and other
objectionable features already mentioned they stand on
an equality, so that in several of the objects of zoning
ordinances, - the promotion of health, safety and
morals .

.

. we may not say that the two schools differ.

But when we come to "the promotion of the general
welfare of the community" - "Ay, there's the rub." The
public school has the same features objectionable to the
surrounding area as a private one, but it has, also, a
virtue which the other lacks, namely, that it is located
to serve and does serve that area without discrimination.
Whether the private school is sectarian or commercial,
though it now complains of discrimination, in its services
it discriminates and the public school does not.2 (Emphasis added.)

The Supreme Court of the United States again dismissed
an appeal for want of a substantial federal question.23
It has been well said that the dissents of Mr. Justice
Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis during the 1920's became
the law of the land a decade later. Accordingly, the dissent
in Wisconsin Lutheran High School seems deserving of
study and consideration inasmuch as it was to be subsequently relied upon by a California petitioner in Roman
Catholic Welfare Corp. v. Piedmont.2" It is not too much
to say that the majority of the Supreme Court of California
in this case followed the reasoning of the dissenting Wisconsin minority. This dissenting opinion took the position
no valid distinction may be made in a zoning ordinance
between public and private schools which teach the same
subjects and comply with the compulsory educational laws
of the state. While admitting that valid classifications for
zoning may be based upon distinctions between municipal
22 State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 267
Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43, 47 (1954).
23 349 U.S. 913 (1955).
24 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955).
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and private property, the dissenting opinion said:
However, it is significant that the courts . .. in zoning
cases have treated private school situations different
than other endeavors of private enterprise. In the field of
education the courts in zoning cases have made 'an ex-

ception to the rule and have not distinguished as between
private and public schools. There is good reason for such
exception ....
Private schools must comply with state
standards in matters of education. 5Privately owned
recreation places need not so comply.2

The Wisconsin Luthern High School case, like Porterville, proved again the fallacy and danger of invoking only
the fourteenth amendment in zoning law appeals involving
churches and religious schools. In both of these cases, the
constitutional question of free exercise of religion was entirely neglected. While these cases left much to be desired
from the standpoint of constitutional procedure, the Piedmont case was to prove a model in this respect. Whereas
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had decided that a zoning ordinance took precedence over a private school, the
Supreme Court of California, by a four to three majority,
held unconstitutional a zoning ordinance which excluded
all private schools, as arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination.2 6 The court said: "Parents have the right to send
their children to private schools, rather than public ones,
which are located in their immediate locality or general
neighborhood."'2 7 Establishment of a residential zone that is
open to public schools but closed to private religious
schools is a direct infringement on that right.
The overall impact of the Piedmont case can best be
seen in relation to the earlier decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,28 holding
25 State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran HighSchool Conference v. Sinar, 267
Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43, 50 (1954).
26 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d
438 (1955).
27 Id. at 441.
28 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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unconstitutional a state statute that made it mandatory
for parents to send their children to public schools. In the
Pierce case, the Supreme Court recognized that the child
is not " . . . the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right ... to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."2
Furthermore, the Court felt it unreasonable to expect
parents to send their children out of the state to attend
private schools.
In Piedmont, the California Supreme Court went beyond
the Piercedecision by applying its doctrine to a residential
city. As a result, it would seem the law in California in
respect to private schools is that the Pierce rule applies
to a "locality" or "neighborhood" unless the zoning authorities can show "exceptional circumstances."
The facts of the Piedmont case merit detailed consideration. In 1929' the city council of Piedmont, a suburb of 12,000 entirely surrounded by the city of Oakland, adopted
a comprehensive zoning ordinance, dividing the city's area
into four zones. In 1936, this ordinance was amended by
the city council and approved by a referendum vote.3" The

amendment provided that in Zone A, embracing 98.7 per
cent of Piedmont's corporate area, "No building shall be
erected which is intended to be occupied or used for any
purpose other than a single family dwelling, church or
public school under the jurisdiction of the Board of Education of the City of Piedmont." (Emphasis added.) In
Zone A there were three public elementary schools, one
public junior high school and one public high school.
When Piedmont's long established Roman Catholic parish of Corpus Christi sought a building permit for its newly
29

268 U.S. at 535.
In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 625 (1943),
the court said at 638: "One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections." (Emphasis added.)
30

ZONING OUT RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

19571

planned school, the application was denied. Unlike the
procedure followed in the Porterville and Wisconsin Lutheran High School cases, counsel for the Roman Catholic
Welfare corporation filed a petition for a writ of mandate
in the California Supreme Court, which has original jurisdiction in the matter of prerogative writs."1 The court entertained the petition and transferred the proceedings to
the District Court of Appeal which granted the writ in a
unanimous decision.2 Following appeal by the City of Piedmont to the California Supreme Court, the final decision
affirming the issuance of the writ was rendered on November 23, 1955. The dissenting opinion relied largely upon
the Wisconsin Lutheran High School and Porterville decisions. In flatly rejecting the former case, the majority
stated: "It is difficult to make an argument that private
schools are inimical to the public welfare while public
schools are not.""3 In State v. Northwestern Preparatory
School, Inc.,3 the Supreme Court of Minnesota had held
that a distinction between public and private schools is
arbitrary. Counsel for the City of Piedmont argued that
without this distinction, the owner of a private school could
locate the school without any control on the part of the city.
The majority of the court were not disturbed by this argument:
This question is not before us ....we have only the question of a private school to be located adjacent to a
Catholic Church in the area where public schools are
found. Respondents' argument that a private school
located in the precise location involved here would be
inimical to the public welfare is not convincing. 35
31

32

Cal. Const. art. 6, § 4.

Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. Piedmont, 278 P.2d 943 (Cal. App.

1955).
33

Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d

438, 442 (1955).
31 228 Minn. 363, 37 N.W.2d 370 (1949). For comparative similarities be-

tween parochial and other private schools, see note, State, Church, and
Child--Statutory Provisions for School Permit, 1 STA. L. REv. 316 (1949).
35 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d

438, 443 (1955).
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TECHNIQUE OF INDIRECTION

The Piedmont, Wisconsin Lutheran High School, and
Porterviltecases had one thing in common, the prohibition
of construction of a church or school by either specific or
implied zoning law restrictions. In fact, all "religious"
zoning law cases studied thus far have involved this common factor. Two cases decided by the Court of Appeals of
New York, however, are unique on their facts in this regard, and deserving of attention. In both cases, community
zoning boards utilized their discretionary powers to block
the use of large tracts of land for religious purposes, a
technique of evasion rather than outright prohibition.
There is good reason to believe that future religious zoning
law litigation will follow this new pattern. At this writing,
for instance, the California District Court of Appeal has
before it a San Mateo County Superior Court decision
which upheld the denial of a permit for a church, based
upon the grounds of "inadequate parking facilities" which
would create a traffic hazard.
The first of these New York decisions, Community Synagogue v. Bates,3 6 was concerned with the application by the
synagogue for a use permit for a mansion situated in the
village of Sands Point. The village building inspector,
after a casual inspection of the existing premises, decided
that the state fire laws had not been complied with although the synagogue had entered into a contract for
alterations necessary for such compliance. Accordingly,
the application for the use permit was denied, and the
Village Zoning Board of Appeals affirmed. The New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division likewise affirmed.3"
The Court of Appeals opinion by Chief Justice Conway,
36 1. N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488 (1956). See also Great Neck Community
School v. Dish, 158 N.Y.S.2d 379 (2d Dep't 1957).
37 Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 App. Div. 2d 686, 147 N.Y.S.2d 204
(2d Dep't 1955).
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reversing the appellate division's denial of the use permit,
seems deserving of consideration, especially with reference
to the first amendment. The opinion did more than reiterate the principle that the question presented for review after the denial of an application by a zoning board is
whether the board's action was arbitrary, capricious, unauthorized, or oppressive. Specifically, and for the first
time, it was held that zoning authorities may not narrowly
limit the functions of a church in the use of its property
to public worship and other strictly religious uses. The
court pointed out that "... all churches recognize that the

area of their responsibility is broader than leading the congregation in prayer."3 The consitutional question raised in
this case was whether the zoning authorities may fix the
location of a church "at a precise spot." The court said:
"... If the municipality has the unfettered power to say
that the 'precise spot' selected is not the right one, the
municipality has the power to say eventually which is the
proper 'precise spot.' That, we all can see is the wrong
solution.""

In the second of these New York cases, Diocese of Rochester v. PlanningBoard,4 the decisive question involved
the validity of a decision of the planning board of the town
of Brighton denying approval of an application for construction of a building for religious uses in a "Class A"
neighborhood. The 1933 Brighton zoning ordinance permitted this type of building if approved. This is entirely
different from outright and specific prohibition, yet the
end result was identical.
The court examined the reasons upon which the planning board had denied approval - there was no school
or church in the area; the adverse affect upon property
values in the area; the loss of potential tax revenue, and
38
39
40

Id. at 493.
Id. at 496.
1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956).
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decreased enjoyments of neighboring property - and then
proceeded to reject them with this preliminary statement
of policy: ". . . It must be borne in mind that churches
and schools occupy a different status from mere commercial enterprise and, when the church enters the picture,
different considerations apply."'"
Was the planning board justified in attempting to exclude
churches and schools from a built-up area, thus driving
them to the outskirts of the community? The court's reply
was: "We know of no rule which requires that churches
may only be established in sparsely settled areas. On the
contrary, '.. . wherever the souls of men are found, there
the house of God belongs.' "'As to the alleged adverse effect
upon property values caused by churches and schools, the
court said: ".... [I]n view of the high purposes, and the
moral value, of these institutions, mere pecuniary loss to a
few persons should not bar their erection and use."43 The
plea of loss of potential tax revenue was answered with:
"... [T]he paramount authority of this State has declared
a policy that churches and schools are more important than
local taxes, and that it is in furtherance of the general welfare to exclude such institutions fron taxation."" The opinion concluded: "That is not to say that appropriate restrictions may never be imposed with respect to a church and
school and accessory uses, nor is to say that under no circumstances may they ever be excluded from designated
areas. In this case, however, . . . the decisions of the town
bodies are arbitrary and unreasonable."'4 5
V.

CONCLUSION

A common denominator in many zoning law cases is
their suburban origin. One sixth of today's 170 million
41

42
43
44
45

Id. at 834.
Id. at 835.

Ibid.
136 N.E.2d at 836.
Id. at 837.
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Americans reside in the suburbs and the rights of minorities frequently clash with the local public opinion of
the majority in these areas. Scores of the suburbs are
merely collections of hundreds of houses thrown up since
World War H having no corporate existence. They are
largely subject to county zoning laws and seldom does
local bigotry and prejudice prevail at the county level.
However, many of these new communities are being incorporated as villages, towns, and cities. As these communities
incorporate, they adopt their own local zoning laws, such
laws frequently reflect the bigotry and, as in Piedmont,
Sands Point, Wauwatosa and Brighton, they eventually
may clash with the constitutional guaranties of the first
and fourteenth amendments.
This country owes its origin to people who refused to be
denied the right of the free exercise of religion. If the
democratic system is to realize its proclaimed values, zoning ordinances must be designed and applied accordingly.
With a constantlyincreasing need for more private educational and religious facilities, zoning problems will continue to share an important part of this country's court
calendars. As the more recent cases which were analyzed
indicate, the trend of decision seems to be in favor of the
churches and schools. The local dodge of arbitrary distinction and unreasonable action is being effectively controlled in many areas. By making use of the more concrete
test provided by the first amendment provisions concerning freedom of religion, rather than the vague criterion of
due process, constitutional privileges will be more readily
assured and private religious organizations will realize
the necessary guaranties for effective activity.
Paul Brindel*
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